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Constitutional theory has rediscovered the problem of governmental
structure. As the rights revolution has matured and entered the main-
stream, the debate is returning to the question that preoccupied the
Founding Fathers: what organization of government is most likely to
establish justice, promote the general welfare, provide for the common
defense, and secure the blessings of liberty?
The overriding contemporary problem is how to treat the adminis-
trative state.' The Constitution contemplates bureaucracies but doesn't
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1. Problems of allocating authority over administration have generated most of the Supreme
Court's recent separation of powers cases. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (role of
"independent counsel" in investigating and prosecuting crimes by high executive branch officials);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (role of Comptroller General in formulating the federal
budget); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (role of CFTC in
adjudicating common-law counterclaims); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568 (1985) (role of binding arbitration in dispute resolution); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(role of Congress in vetoing agency action); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (role of bankruptcy judges in adjudicating private rights); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (role of Congress in appointing Federal Election Commissioners). Problems of
administration also figure prominently in three upcoming Supreme Court cases, Ameron, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218
(1988) (No. 87-163) (role of Comptroller General in delaying awards or performance of procurement
contracts), and United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo.), cert. granted sub nora.
United States v. Mistretta, 108 S. Ct. 2818 (1988) (No. 87-1904) (role of "independent commission in
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clearly assign authority over them.2 In theory, administrative agencies
might be controlled by (1) the President, (2) the Congress, (3) neither the
President nor the Congress, or (4) both the President and the Congress.
Each scheme has shortcomings. The first two exalt a single branch; the
last two blur the distinctions between branches. Each has been proposed
as defining appropriate power relations over the administrative state.3
The problem of allocating authority over administration is particu-
larly severe in the case of independent agencies. 4 The distinguishing fea-
ture of such agencies is that their principal officers are protected against
presidential removal at will.5 The removal power is ordinarily supposed
to carry with it a high degree of supervisory authority: "'[o]nce an of-
the judicial branch" in formulating sentencing guidelines); Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Dole, No.
86-C-815-E (N.D. Okla. Feb. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Dist file, No. 7363), cert granted, 57 U.S.L.W. -
(U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) (role of Transportation Department in funding regulatory program through as-
sessments on a regulated industry).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("principal Officer in each of the executive Departments"); id.
§ 2, cl. 2 ("Officers" and "inferior Officers" of the United States); id § 3 ("Officers of the United
States); id. § 4 ("civil Officers of the United States").
3. For examples of the legislative viewpoint, see E. KRAsNow, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY,
THE POLrrIcs OF BROADCAST REGULATION 89 (3d ed. 1982) (reporting House Speaker Sam Ray-
burn's remark to FCC Chairman Newton Minow that "your agency is an arm of the Congress; you
belong to us"); 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY
ON FEDERAL REGULATION 31 (endorsing "arm of Congress" theory). For an executive branch
perspective, see Meese, Towards Increased Government Accountability, 32 FED. B. NEws & J. 406,
408 (1985) (reprint of Address before Federal Bar Association, September 13, 1985) (questioning
rationale for agency independence of the President). Agency independence from control by either
branch was favored by early New Deal theorists, especially James Landis. See J. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 111 (1938). Most contemporary scholars endorse the theory of shared
control. See, eg., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking 88 YALE L.J. 451
(1979); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984).
4. For prior work addressing the constitutionality of independent agencies, see Anderson,
Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 277 (1987);
Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 491 (1987);
Bruff, supra note 3; Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Cr. REv. 19;
Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions (pts. 1 & 2), 24
CORNELL L.Q. 13, 163 (1938-1939); Donovan & Irvine, The President's Power to Remove Members
of Administrative Agencies, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1936); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup.
Cr. REV. 41; Parker, The Removal Power of the President and Independent Administrative Agencies,
36 IND. L.J. 63 (1960); Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation
of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 460-64 (1987); Shane, Conventionalism in Constitutional Inter-
pretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 573 (1987); Strauss, supra note
3; Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63
B.U.L. REV. 59 (1983); Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986
DUKE L.J. 779; Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787 (1987);
Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985).
5. In addition, independent agencies usually display some or all of the following features: (1)
leadership by multi-member panels; (2) political criteria for appointment, with no more than a sim-
ple majority permitted from a single party; (3) broad rulemaking authority; (4) power to conduct on-
the-record adjudications; (5) power to conduct investigations and bring enforcement actions; and (6)
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ficer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not
the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the perform-
ance of his functions, obey.' "6 Accordingly, any substantial limitation
on the removal power necessarily reduces the supervisory authority of
the person exercising the power.7 The President's power over the heads
of independent agencies, whom he can remove only "for cause," is there-
fore considered to be substantially weaker than is his power over the
heads of "executive branch" agencies, who can be removed for any rea-
son or no reason at all. From this, the inference is drawn that the regula-
tory commissions are "independent" of presidential power. The word
"independent" attains a life of its own and exercises a powerful hypnotic
influence over analysis.
The principal issue is not one of constitutional law narrowly de-
fined.8 The Supreme Court upheld "for cause" removal limitations in
Humphrey's Executor ;9 its recent opinion in Morrison v. Olson 10 left little
doubt about the continuing validity of such limitations, at least as applied
to classical regulatory commissions. Thus, despite their theoretical in-
congruity,II independent agencies are not going to be judicially invali-
dated any time soon.12
The most interesting questions about independent agencies are ones
of political theory. What is the policy rationale for establishing an in-
dependent instead of an executive branch agency? What political forces
specialized mandate directing the agency to focus either on particular industries or on specific cross-
cutting problems.
6. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)).
7. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 & n.34 (1988).
8. For discussion of the doctrinal elements in separation of powers analysis, see G. Miller, The
Law of Separation of Powers: A Primer on Doctrine (Oct. 3, 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
9. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935). Although commonly
understood as a direct affirmation of independent agencies, Humphrey's Executor is not quite on
point because the issue was not whether the President could remove the officer at will, but whether
the officer had a right to the payment of salary after his removal. See Miller, supra note 4, at 94
n.195.
10. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Morrison upheld a statute that, inter alia, allows the President
(through the Attorney General) to remove "independent counsel[s]" only for "good cause, physical
disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of
[their] duties.") Id. at 2604 (quoting the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1988)).
11. See Currie, supra note 4, at 19-20.
12. See SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding power of
SEC to conduct civil enforcement actions). There remain serious questions, however, as to (1) what
officers other than regulatory commissioners can be protected against presidential removal at plea-
sure, and (2) whether cause, as the basis for removal, can include an officer's failure to comply with a
presidential directive. See G. Miller, The Removal Power After Morrison (Sept. 14, 1988) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
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shape the decision about agency structure? What are the differences in
practical function between independent agencies and their executive
branch counterparts? How significant are these differences? To the ex-
tent they exist, do they improve or impair the quality of administration?
The present symposium focuses on these empirical questions.
Although the authors differ widely in their political views, they all focus
on the practical meaning of independence in the actual functioning of
administrative agencies. The essays provide a useful antidote to the
sometimes overly legalistic tone of prior debate.13 Any future analysis of
the political legitimacy of independent agencies should profit from the
insights contained in these pages.
Particularly welcome, in this regard, is Susan Bartlett Foote's skep-
tical view of the independent agencies debate. 14 Drawing on the empiri-
cal political science literature, Foote debunks the myth of radical
separation between executive and independent agencies. Both types of
agencies operate in a complex field of political forces, including pressures
from the President, the relevant congressional committees, the regulated
industries, and other interest groups. Foote attributes the heated tenor of
debate between partisans and opponents of independent agencies to polit-
ical controversy rather than neutral analysis, correctly observing that
many prominent critics of agency independence are affiliated with the
Reagan administration while leading advocates of independent agencies
tend to be political liberals. I believe Foote overstates the influence of
politics on the debate; while undoubtedly abstract principles of constitu-
tional law are often used to mask short-term political goals, there is also
an important stratum of scholarly literature, pro and con, written by re-
searchers with no particular ax to grind. Further, while Foote is surely
correct that the contrast between independent and and executive agencies
is often exaggerated, even the studies she cites suggest that independent
agencies may be somewhat more responsive to Congress, and somewhat
more insulated from the President, than are traditional executive branch
agencies.' 5 Authors in the present symposium with practical experience
in independent agencies testify that Congress exercises substantial influ-
13. For useful earlier works with an empirical bent, see M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSI-
NESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES (1962); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
14. Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the De-
bate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223.
15. See Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Poli-
cymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Moe, Regulatory Perform-
ance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982).
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ence over the activities of these bodies. 16 The fact that the difference is
discernible only at the margin does not make it insignificant; the question
is whether these marginal differences are important enough to raise ques-
tions about the efficacy and legitimacy of independent agencies.
Glen 0. Robinson, a former Commissioner of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, shares much of Foote's skepticism as to whether
"independence" makes much of a difference. 17 Robinson observes that
presidential influence is virtually never brought to bear on adjudications,
whether in independent or executive agencies, and if it were, the influ-
ence would be improper as a matter of due process. As to rulemaking
and enforcement, the President has no authority to influence any agency,
executive or independent, to act contrary to its statutory mandate. Even
where there is substantial discretion over the course of action to take, the
result reached must be independently justifiable on judicial review,
whether or not the President has influenced the outcome.
And even in the areas of discretion that remain after all this, it
would be an error, according to Robinson, to overstress the significance
of removal in the scheme of presidential influence. The President enjoys
many powers to influence agency action other than the threat of removal,
including appointments, budgetary control, and the promise of higher
office. Conversely, the President is subject to many limitations other
than requirements that removal be only "for cause." Robinson's discus-
sion of these practical factors is insightful and convincing. I am less con-
vinced by his argument that given the relative unimportance of the
distinction between independent and executive branch agencies, the best
solution is simply to maintain the status quo. If a governmental struc-
ture with dubious constitutional underpinnings can be invalidated with-
out significant disruption in administration-and I believe this could
easily be accomplished in the case of independent agencies18-it would
seem more logical that the burden of proof should rest on those seeking
to sustain the arrangement. An argument similar to Robinson's could
have been made in the legislative veto case, 19 on the ground that Con-
gress had enacted nearly two hundred legislative veto provisions and that
the differences between statutes with legislative vetoes and those without
legislative vetoes were minor in practice. The Court rejected the argu-
ment and invalidated the statutes-with no discernible ill effects on gov-
16. See Miller, A Reflection on the Independence ofIndependent Agencies, 1988 DuKE L.J. 297,
298-99; Peters, Reflections on the Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DuKE L.J. 286, 293-
96; Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative 1988 DUKE L.J.
238, 243-46;Wiley, "Political" Influence at the FCC, 1988 DUKE L.J. 280, 282.
17. Robinson, supra note 16, at 250.
18. See Miller, supra note 4, at 86-90.
19. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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ernment functioning. Why would a similar result not be appropriate in
the case of independent agencies?
Alan Morrison, probably the nation's leading private lawyer in the
field of separation of powers, 20 is also skeptical of whether "indepen-
dence" makes much practical difference. 21 Although in his view in-
dependent agencies are more independent of presidential influence than
are executive agencies, the difference is "not substantial" in light of the
important powers retained by the President and the executive branch,
including powers of appointment, budget, and litigating authority. 22
Moreover, the traditional rationales for agency independence, such as the
need for insulation from politics or for multi-member panels to review
decisions by administrative law judges, do not make much sense. None-
theless, although independent agencies are "an anomaly," Morrison-
showing the admirable instincts of a practical lawyer-thinks that noth-
ing can or should be done about the situation given the minor practical
importance of the distinction. Morrison would probably agree with
Robinson's allocation of the burden of proof to those who would fold the
independent agencies back into the executive branch.
Paul Verkuil's contribution 23 examines an exceedingly important
question: what reasons, other than political expediency, might explain
the choice to vest one administrative function in an independent agency
and another function in an executive branch agency? Verkuil's thesis is
that the classic multi-member agency is best suited to perform the func-
tion of adjudication, but there is a mismatch between form and function
when these agencies are allowed to engage in broad rulemaking or en-
forcement activities. His proposal-which he disarmingly labels as
"modest" 24-is to separate out the adjudicatory functions of multi-mem-
ber agencies and to fold the rulemaking and enforcement functions back
into executive branch agencies, with the heads of these executive agencies
being protected by "for cause" removal limitations as a quid pro quo to
Congress for relinquishing some of its powers to influence polieymaking.
Verkuil is to be commended for trying to make sense of an organizational
pattern that most have found chaotic, 25 even if doing so requires heroic
efforts of the cut-and-paste variety. He is undoubtedly correct in saying
20. Morrison successfully conducted the Chadha litigation, and is currently involved in an im-
portant Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo.), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Mistretta, 108 S. Ct. 2818 (1988) (No. 87-1904).
21. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Agencies?, 1988 DuKE L.L 252.
22. Id. at 253.
23. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257.
24. Id. at 275.
25. See, eg., Miller, supra note 4, at 72-75; Strauss, supra note 3.
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that multi-member panels work much better as appellate adjudicative
tribunals than as rulemakers or enforcers.2 6 But I believe he underesti-
mates the problems of lack of regulatory coordination and reduced ac-
countability that would attend his proposal to protect even traditional
executive branch administrators against removal for cause. 27 Neverthe-
less, his proposal is remarkably thoughtful and creative; if adopted, it
would work a significant change in the structure of the federal
government.
Richard E. Wiley, former Chairman of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, provides a lively account of his real-world experience
with both the reality and the (mis)perception of political influence at the
agency.28 Wiley's observation that "the most powerful and persistent
'political' influence over the [FCC] clearly originates with the congres-
sional appropriations and oversight committees and with other impor-
tant members of the legislature"2 9 tends to support the thesis that
independent agencies are subject to greater congressional influence than
are executive branch agencies. Yet Wiley clearly perceives the agency's
task to be that of remaining independent from political influence either
from the President or the Congress; his institutional loyalty, which is
probably shared by most other commissioners of independent agencies, is
primarily to the agency and its mandate. Thus, Wiley would probably
endorse as a normative matter the autonomy model mentioned in the
second paragraph of this essay rather than the models of capture by the
President or the Congress.
Aulana Peters, a former Commissioner of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, shares Wiley's preference for the autonomy model
of the independent agency, although like Wiley she is well aware of the
various formal and informal mechanisms by which the President and
Congress can attempt to influence agency decisions. Independent agen-
cies in her view are a "fourth branch of government operating separately
from but under the oversight or review of the other three."'30 Despite
certain practical problems, such as the difficulty of resolving interagency
26. A lesson is available from the earliest days of the Republic, when Congress attempted to
administer the country with multi-member panels but eventually abandoned the effort in favor of
single executives when panels proved ineffectual. See Guggenheimer, The Development of the Execu-
tive Departments, 1775-1789, in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: 1775-1789, at 116, 120 (J. Jameson ed. 1970); C. THACH, THE
CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 59-70
(1969).
27. See Miller, supra note 4, at 75-83.
28. See Wiley, supra note 16, at 280.
29. Id. at 282.
30. Peters, supra note 16, at 286.
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disputes involving independent agencies, she views the independent
agency form as justified by the need for technical expertise and the desir-
ability of freeing enforcement responsibilities from political interfer-
ence. 31 Among all the essays in this symposium, Peters' viewpoint
probably most closely resembles the classic "functional" justification for
independent agencies originally formulated by James Landis and others
during the New Deal period. 32
James C. Miller, III brings to his essay33 practical experience both
as Chairman of an independent agency (the Federal Trade Commission)
and as head of the Office of Management and Budget, an agency in the
Executive Office of the President. Miller joins Peters and Wiley in view-
ing independence as giving a certain practical measure of autonomy to
the agency head, subject to lobbying from many sources, most promi-
nently including members of Congress. But Miller departs from these
authors in that he sees independence as unfortunate because it reduces
political accountability and inhibits policy coordination. Accordingly,
Miller favors eliminating agency independence and vesting the responsi-
bilities now exercised by independent agencies in officials serving at the
pleasure of the President.
The contributions to this symposium amply demonstrate the impor-
tance and interest of the subject. I commend all of these essays for the
outstanding insights that they provide on one of the most engrossing and
difficult questions in American political life.
31. Id. at 290-93.
32. See J. LANDIS, supra note 3.
33. Miller, supra note 16, at 297.
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